Leaders tied and millions died.

They did not win World War 2 and no one was held accountable for Vietnam. Who makes a living by war: who gains, who loses?

It is understandable that those in power sometimes choose between evils but it is not forgivable if they initiate the evil. The leaders hope that taxpayers will forget their former incompetence but, if we take international law seriously, then all the generals since Truman have sometimes acted criminally. They upheld Nixon’s view, “When the President does it, it’s not illegal”.

Simple dictionary definitions, however, show war is war and murder is murder and juries won’t usually forgive the latter. After the Nazis rejected their constitution, even a Holocaust was “legal” - but what lessons do American children learn when murdering leaders walk free?

Most of these films refer to ground truth in South Vietnam but it was also a brutal air war. Bombs or incendiaries did most of the slaughter. Airdropped chemicals poisoned the food supply for a slower death. The fact Vietnam prevailed even after Nixon tried to “bomb them back into the stone age” provides lessons that our people and selected leaders refuse to learn. If killing civilians was evil when Nazis did it (Guernica, Warsaw, Rotterdam, London, Belgrade, etc.), why would it be less evil if we do it? Again - where is the accountability?

\[
\text{Note: This work in progress is compiled from film and book reviews or otherwise edited from YouTube descriptions.}
\]

\[
\text{Films are listed by date, books by title. If a book was later made into a film it is only listed here under the film.}
\]

\[
\text{In the Year of the Pig (1968, 163m, Emile de Antonio)}
\]

De Antonio (1919-1989) was born in Scranton PA and attended Harvard with John F. Kennedy. He served in WW2 as a AAF bomber pilot. Most of his films are now on YouTube. As a documentary director, he detailed 1950-80s political events, starting with \[Point of Order\] (1964) that compiled segments of the Army-McCarthy hearings. \[Rush to Judgment\] (1967) was about Kennedy’s assassination. \[Year of the Pig\] was his favorite film and a tutorial on early U.S. involvement in Vietnam. After being nominated for best documentary (1968) it premiered soon after the Tet Offensive to meet Opposition and even hostility. Showings were most often at college campuses. Its historical record has a Marxian slant that portrays Ho Chi Minh as a patriot trying to reunite his nation. There is an almost unbroken flow of personal testimonies by those who went those who led (including Johnson & Nixon), and those who fought. Using irony music and contradictory statements by the military brass, troops, and politicians, de Antonio makes a scathing indictment of the US role. He made two more powerful films: \[Underground\] (1976) and \[In the King of Prussia\] (1982 anti-nuclear protest near Philadelphia) that exposed judicial failure in PA. His last film was \[Mr. Hoover and I\] (1989) revealed how the FBI had documented his activities in 10,000 pages.

\[
\text{Greetings (1968, 88m, de Palma)}
\]

>www.youtube.com/watch?v=eD5ZO2_f554<h> honored at 1969 Berlin Film Festival.

An early De Palma film satirizing the 1960s (LBJ, Greenwich Village counterculture, Vietnam, draft resisting, JFK assassination, etc.).

\[
\text{Noam Chomsky vs. William F Buckley on the Vietnam War (1969, 52m, Firing Line)}
\]

>www.youtube.com/watch?v=gihLzLmbCu0<h> Complete interview for Chomsky’s \American Power and the new Mandarins\.

It was his first political book, followed by several dozen. It was his first political book, followed by several dozen.

\[
\text{Winter Soldier (1972, 93m, VHS 1992 110-130m, 2005, as produced \text{contrasts Pains’s "summer soldier and sunshine patriot" }}
\]

This documentary of the \[Winter Soldier Investigation\] (31 Jan.-2 Feb. 1971) by Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) publicized war crimes. The gathering took place in Detroit and 125 witnesses testified about crimes they had witnessed or committed during the years of 1967-1970. It’s a time capsule of once powerful movements admitting their wrongs and exposes a myth that only hippies preached. Testimony of 30 years ago has still not been acknowledged or forgiven. Today, we have witnessed our airmen and marines commit war crimes in Afghanistan and well have been about Iraq. Despite reviews of two European film festivals, this powerful film was nearly banned after the 1972 NYC release.

It got very little distribution or national support and had to be archived by its creators. The mainstream media rejected \text{Winter Soldier} as an overly emotional, if not unpatriotic, criticism of the Vietnam fighting and its war crime details.

This public forum, however, marked a pivotal shift in the anti-war movement. It was clear that young vets from around the country were also opposed to U.S. policy, including the young John Kerry. Their courage in testifying and investigation in Congress forever changed things. The film had limited re-release across the U.S. in 2005 (see \text{wintersoldierfilm.com}) with mostly positive reviews. A rare showing of this documentary at University of Washington (Seattle, 29 Jan. 2014) was followed by a panel discussion of Vietnam with experts Bill Turley and Mike McDercit with Nick Turse. Their video “Revisiting War Crimes During the War in Viet Nam” starts with Turse speaking on his controversial book, \text{Kill Anything That Moves} (2013) about US war crimes. It was sponsored by the Southeast Asia Center, UW Center for Human Rights, UW Bookstore, and Seattle chapter of Veterans for Peace.

>www.youtube.com/watch?v=sYoO8rIwRA<h>

\[
\text{FTA (1972, 97m, Francine Parker) trailer at \text{www.youtube.com/watch?v=F56NhYeJRk}}<
\]

A documentary about a political troupe headed by Jane Fonda and Donald Sutherland which traveled to towns near military bases in the US in the early 1970s. They put on shows called “F.T.A.”, which stood for “F**k the Army”, aimed at convincing soldiers to voice opposition to the Vietnam War. Various entertainers performed antiwar songs and skits during the show.

\[
\text{Hearts and Minds (1974, 112m, Peter Davis)}
\]

>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1d2ml82lc7s<h> \text{Best Feature Documentary}

This expose of U.S. involvement in Vietnam takes its title from President Johnson’s statement that ultimate victory in Vietnam would depend on the “hearts and minds of the people who actually live out there.”

The documentary explores the attitudes surrounding the conflict by using archived footage of news reports with intertitles on war crimes. It ends with a scene of the Tet Offensive - a spectacle of the US military’s inability to wage a war in Vietnam. The film’s combination of arrogance and military might that lost the Vietnam War.

\[
\text{Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, National Security Advisor Walt Rostow, and Daniel Ellsberg are among many others interviewed. The stylistic technique intersperses pictures of soldiers destroying villages and visiting brothels, with images of troops being fitted with prosthetics because of their injuries. Such truthful juxtaposed imagery caused some critics to call it anti-war propaganda. The landmark release of the film was also delayed by Rostow’s legal challenges that caused Columbia Pictures to refuse distribution. The producers bought back the rights and showed it for a week (in LA) to be eligible for consideration for 1975 Awards and it won for the \text{Best Feature Documentary}.}
\]

\[
\text{Decent Interval (1977, 616m, Mike Wallace on 60 Minutes \text{with Frank Snepp (33m) & Description of CIA Torture}} (28m)}
\]

Based on book \text{Decent Interval: An Insider’s Account of Saigon’s Indecent End (1977, 616m)} >www.youtube.com/watch?v=6DlJALiHfPc<h> (33m) and >www.youtube.com/watch?v=4zVJLxCI_28<h> (28m)
The book is a well-regarded classic, written at some sacrifice, to provide a scathing critique of the CIA’s role in the final departure from Vietnam (1975). It told by a Chief CIA Strategy Analyst in Vietnam, who believed in the CIA’s cause but was disillusioned by a treacherous abandonment of Vietnamese allies. It remains a riveting testament to a dark episode of American history. Its view is briefly summarized in Last Days in Vietnam (below). This summary is from Snepp’s website (see www.youtube.com/watch?v=8KvOoN2NYYc).

It ended that way due to wishful thinking by a lot of American officials who did not want to admit the war was lost. They waited too long to plan for the exit. In early 1975 the North Vietnamese began chipping away close to the capital to test Saigon’s resiliency. The president of South Vietnam, Nguyen Van Thieu panicked and, in mid-March, to preserve his best forces ordered them back to two crucial areas The withdrawal quickly turned into a rout. Over the next two weeks their Communists sliced the country in two and eliminated half of Saigon’s army. Some Embassy officials, including Ambassador Graham Martin, could not believe it. He was a Cold Warrior who had lost a son in Vietnam and wasn’t going to lose Saigon. He kept insisting that Saigon still had a chance and refused to plan for a proper evacuation and many in the Embassy, including ambassador Graham Martin persuaded President Thieu to step down and get out of Vietnam. Thieu escaped safely but the Communists didn’t pause. Retreat is the most difficult of all military operations.

But as a matter of honor you do not leave friends on the battlefield. In the evacuation of Saigon over half of the Vietnamese who finally got out escaped on their own with no help from us until they were far at sea. Many didn’t make it.

The last CIA message from U.S. Embassy declared “Let’s hope we do not repeat history. This is Saigon station signing off.”

In the other video (28m), Snepp talks about the CIA, Vietnam and torture based on broadcast interviews on national security, official secrecy, the CIA, counterefficiency, interrogation, torture, and Snepp’s return to the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. These torture revelations are now just another chapter in policies that have gone on for decades. During the Vietnam War, the CIA experimented with many different techniques of desiring people to extract information but it ultimately fails to get accurate results. Snepp tells the story.

**Go Tell the Spartans** (1978, 114m, Ted Post) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yj0OYydW8qk

In our other fiction with U.S. advisors in 1964 Vietnam incident. Army Raiders are led by a dedicated major (Burt Lancaster) trying to deal with an increasingly untenable struggle against VC that doomed a French unit at the same site a decade earlier.

**Zero Year: The Silent Death of Cambodia** (1979, 52m, John Pilger) >www.youtube.com/watch?v=0rpZz5L_ylo<

Nixon and Kissinger illegally and secretly unleashed 100,000 tons of bombs (the equivalent of 5 Hiroshimas) on neutral Cambodia.

**Coming Home** (1978, 86m, Hal Ashby) Luke’s Speech at www.youtube.com/watch?v=duyYbn2TkyY (4m)

The plot follows a love triangle between a young woman, her Marine husband, and a paralyzed Vietnam War veteran (Jon Voight) who meets while her husband is overseas. Jane Fonda conceived the film in 1972 as a first feature of her film company, IPC (Indochina Peace Campaign). It was inspired by a friendship with Jon Kovic, who met in an antiwar rally. Voight, who also participated in the antiwar movement, asked for the part. It compares to The Best Years of Our Lives (1946) except that it over-plays. Ashby had done Shampoo (1975) about the ignorant 1960’s elite, so maybe he was compensating. Fonda and Voight won Academy Awards for their performances.

**Apocalypse Now** (1979, 154m, F. Coppola) also see Hearts of Darkness: A Filmmaker’s Apocalypse (1991, 96m, et al)

The film received vast acclaim upon its release, but is based on Conrad’s Heart of Darkness as a study of characters and images. It is not an accurate recreation of the Vietnam experience. The spectacular cinematography and sound was not needed for a look into the places of the soul that most Americans never want to discover. For those who never experienced combat, however, such sterile emotions replace intellectual exercise. Coppola, considered the film to be both anti-war and anti-chic, about how much the media hid the brutality of what was really going on, and epic lies perpetuate the possibility of war. The film shows the airman brutality of combat at the local level. For example the emblematic attack on a village (with loudspeakers blaring Ride of the Valkyries) and praise to “the smell of napalm in the morning” can be seen as pro-war until it is contrasted to its [suggested] purpose - to allow soldiers to surf. The assertion of American supremacy with its image of technology destroying nature may seem to glorify combat, but we then recall how it all ended. It does offer an insight into the lack of strategic leadership. It’s haunting visions are mostly hallucinatory art.


Written by CNN correspondent Peter Arnett, these episodes trace the course of the conflict from the closing days of World War II when Ho Chi Minh first began to assemble his revolutionary army to the fall of Saigon in 1975. With extensive archival footage shot by Pitt Johnson) trying to deal with an increasingly untenable struggle against VC that doomed a French unit at the same site a decade earlier.


This early documentary is part of the Alternative Views collection (#107) that exposes the nature and effects of using Agent Orange in Viet Nam. Dan Jordan, his wife, and another vet, discuss experiences with “unexplained” diseases and handicapped children. They provide information about a Brotherhood of Viet Nam Nam Vets efforts seeking government assistance for vets affected by Agent Orange. The program also includes a showing of the 1953 government documentary in which an A-bomb was dropped in Nevada, and then American soldiers were marched into the blast area immediately afterward to show that atomic warfare is “safe” (but many had died or cancer.) The final interview is about secret, U.S. based germ and chemical warfare experiments carried out since the 1950s.

**Vietnam: A Television History** (13 part 1983, 780m / 10 part 1997, 660m, Richard Ellison @ WGBH-TV Boston) six Emmy

This documentary TV mini-series about Vietnam (1955-1975) from the perspective. Two of the original 13 episodes were later dropped (2&13) and censored from DVD version. Stanley Karnow, served as chief correspondent and his book Vietnam: A History (1984, 800p) accompanied the series. It was a well-written history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam that delivers a precise prose account, with criticism of errors made by political and military leaders. The account of the French and Viet Minh offers a background to U.S. government policy and how it ultimately failed even after Nixon changed that policy (1969) to “Vietnamize" the war. Despite a fascinating description of how the JFK initially supported Ngo Dinh Diem, then tacitly approved of a coup (1963), the book generally neglects the CIA’s and Dulles brothers prominent role in dragging the U.S. to war and later crimes like the bombing or Operation PHOENIX.

**Witness to War: Dr. Charlie Clements** (1985, 29m, Goodman) Interview at www.youtube.com/watch?v=YIyGe-lGRUS

Won Best Short Documentary. Dr. Clements left the Air Force in 1970 and wrote book (later narrated) about why he refused to fly more combat missions in Vietnam. He eventually became a doctor with the AFSC, assisting rural population of El Salvador during its civil war. He served as President/CEO of the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee (2003-2010) and earlier was President of Physicians for Human Rights. He currently serves as Executive Director of Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at JFK School of Government at Harvard.

3 The series was consolidated into 13-hour-long episodes for American television syndication and released on videocassette format by Embassy and won a National Education Association award for best world documentary.

4 He was also a correspondent for the London Observer. NBC News, editor of the New Republic, and a columnist for Newsweek International.

5 He won a Pulitzer Prize in history for his book (later narrated) In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines (1989). His earlier books include Mac and Chase. From Revolution to Restoration (1973),...
The book (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1989) by South Vietnamese sociologist professor Tran Van, examines the nature of the war at the macro level—polish the politicians and generals—and with common soldiers. It provided fresh insight into nature of war and insights into the feelings of the fighting men. Gibson shows how war was designed and managed like a factory, with high-ranking officers being managers and frontline soldiers being workers. One product was body count, often through attrition. The result was soldiers being used as ambush bait on search and destroy missions. The U.S. emphasized sophisticated technology, Vietnamese civilians who got in the way were subjected to continuous atrocities. Technology not only failed to bring American victory, but also was often counterproductive in a popularly supported political war of national liberation. The second part describes how Vietnamese overcame technical superiority. In the air war; sorties were an equivalent to body counts and resulted in heavy bombing with inflated results passed up the U.S. military chain of command. It also describes the collapse of the U.S. Army as a fighting force. Soldiers sometimes refused to fight and a few killed disliked leaders (“fraggging”). Mass media misrepresented the war and the widespread South Vietnamese corruption. Intelligence reports understated enemy strength. Finally Dr. Gibson critiques two schools of thought about the war: the liberal (“It was just a series of little mistakes, without any villains”) and the conservative (We didn’t use enough force.). He concluded (1989) how U.S leaders had not learned anything from the Vietnam experience. They were using the same methods in Central America [and now in the Middle East].

Platoon (1986, 120m, O. Stone) See Stone talk about it at >www.youtube.com/watch?v=EFlWsmTCoQ< 50m

Platoon is a realistic look at a soldier’s (Charlie Sheen) tour of duty in Vietnam in late ‘60s. He’s shipped off and serves with a diverse group of fellow grunts under two men who lead the platoon: Sgt. Barnes (Tom Berenger), whose facial scars are a mirror of the violence and corruption of his soul, and Sgt. Elias (Willem Dafoe), who fights with moral courage even though he does not believe in the cause. After a few weeks in country, the soldier quickly loses his idealism after a search for enemy troops devolves into a war crime. Unlike earlier Vietnam fiction (Deer Hunter, Apocalypse Now, Coming Home), it is a soldier’s-eye view that focuses on those who suffered the wounds of war (Stone also volunteered & got two purple hearts). The onscreen battles mix combat details (bugs, jungle rot, exhaustion, C-ration5, marijuana, and DEOS counting) but also examines human duality in the horrors of war. This film established Stone’s reputation after Salvador by winning Oscars for Best Picture, Director, Sound, Film Editing (plus 4 nominations). 1st of Stone’s Vietnam trilogy.

Hamburger Hill (1987, 104m, John Irvin) Trailer at >www.youtube.com/watch?v=DBJ8TsQZwz+< several clips

Platoon level view, based on the assault on a fortified NVA position near the Laotian border (Ap Bia Mountain) in May 1969.

Born on the Fourth of July (1989, 145m, O. Stone) with author Ron Kovic. 2nd of Stone’s Vietnam trilogy. >www.youtube.com/watch?v=J565bOYUHE2< (2014, 2m) www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWbFmCq1t1o (2013, 1m), >www.youtube.com/watch?v=dJdMsu04+5k (2009, 5m)

Based on Kovic’s 1977 book, co-written with Stone, it tells the true story of a patriotic, all-American small town athlete (Tom Cruise) who shocks his family by enlisting as a Marine to fight in Vietnam. Once overseas, his enthusiasm turns to confusion and horror when he accidentally kills one of his men in a fire fight. Then a wound leaves him paralyzed below the chest. After a meeting stay in a veteran’s hospital, he gets increasingly disillusioned. He pulls his life together to become an outspoken anti-war activist. The emotionally powerful film may be Cruise’s best performance. Both he and Stone were nominated for Oscars as was the film, and Stone won as director.

The Cu Chi Tunnels (1990, 59m, Mickey Grant) >www.youtube.com/watch?v=19JFuEhYyk/<

The book Tunnels of Cu Chi (1985, 320p, T Mangold & J Penycate) is a war classic that describes the determination of those who dug the tunnels and then lived beneath the ground. The wiry “tunnel rat” soldiers, who were brave enough to fight in the narrow darkness, were a feared foe of this underground community. In contrast, it is told by America’s former enemy (with subtitles) about over 200 miles of secret underground tunnels sprawled from Cu Chi province to the edge of Saigon which was originally built in the time of the French and later enlarged. When the Americans began bombing Cu Chi’s villages, the survivors went underground for the duration. The film is about the determination of those who lived beneath the ground in secret tunnels joined villages and often passed beneath American bases. They were Viet Cong fortifications and also a center for community life, with schools hidden beneath destroyed villages, public spaces where couples were married, and private places for lovers. There were hospitals where surgery was done on war casualties and children were born. There were even theaters for song, dance, and traditional stories. The story is told (mainly) by a surgeon, an artist, an engineer, and the few survivors of a guerilla unit who left the tunnels each night to fight against a vastly superior foe. Footage by documentary filmmakers who were attached to the guerilla bands survived the war and provides a fascinating insight. 9

Heaven & Earth (1993, 142m, O. Stone) >www.youtube.com/watch?v=QwXoOFZ9kX< Concluded Stone’s Vietnam trilogy.

A visually impressive, true story presented by a Vietnamese woman who survived a hard life during and after the Vietnam conflict. Le Ly Hayslip was a freedom fighter, hustler, young mother, a sometime prostitute, and wife of a US. Marine. After escaping VC violence, she leaves her farming village with her mother for Saigon. After disgracing herself by becoming pregnant, she moves in with her sister. While winning best seller (1990, 267m, O. Stone) See Stone talk about it at >www.youtube.com/watch?v=I19q15BmU0OA<

Here the narrator tells his story that leads him to the allies. There is also a later O. Stone film called The Quiet Mutiny. >www.youtube.com/watch?v=lFvcuuS5eUI< and >www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hpr1HYZDzHY<

John Pilger received several awards for his Vietnam reporting over ten years. He was at the American Embassy in Saigon on the last day in 1975. He returns to Vietnam to review the previous twenty years, seeking to rescue something of Vietnam past and present from Hollywood images which pitied the invader while overshadowing one of the most epic struggles of the 20th century. With the embargo on the country now lifted by Clinton, he describes Vietnam’s effort to resist economic plunder by the U.S. and other powerful countries. He had also did Do You Remember Vietnam? (1978, 52m) >www.youtube.com/watch?v=EO_USBlm00ArA> to see how the new regime was rebuilding.

A Bright Shining Lie (1998 on HBO, 120m, & T George) interview is at >www.youtube.com/watch?v=sp8MD_j4Rbw<

To convincingly reenact Neil Sheehan’s 1988 Pulitzer Prize-winning best seller11 about the conflict in Vietnam and John Paul Vann (acted by Bill Paxton) this TV docudrama filmed in Thailand. On arrival, Vann disagreed with how the war was run and exposed some deceptive battle reports, falsified casualty figures, and other lies. Journalist Steven Burnett relayed the truth to American media. After suffering serious injuries, he returns to Vietnam and reveals Westmoreland’s failure. Under budget constraints, the film accurately conveys Sheehan’s long biography into a single story examining how we tried to win by brutally conventional means, even after Tet. Vann’s military life provided a fulfillment he lacked as a non-combatant. His eventual suicide occurred in the room where he wrote The Sacred Night.
We Were Soldiers Once... And Young (2002, 138m, Wallace) See CBS Report www.youtube.com/watch?v=iBjLU0SNSyC (27m)

Although based on a best-selling book (1992, 480p, LGT Moore & journalist J.L. Galloway), this film inaccurately portrays the first major battle between NVA regulars and U.S. troops in the La Drang Valley. 1Brig/1 Cav conducted an airborne assault led by 1Bn/77th Cav into LZ X-ray near Cambodia. It was nearly overrun but called all available air support, including first tactical use of B-52 bombers. 1Bn/77th Cav was extracted after two days, it did not end with a heroic charge. A stranded platoon had been rescued mainly by 2Bn/54th Cav. Co., nearly overran was saved by BCO's 2Bn/54th Cav, which repulsed a major NVA push on the former line of Co.,...In fact, most of the NVA division survived and over the next two days destroyed 2Bn/54th Cav in an ambush while it marched to LZ Albany. The remnants were destroyed in a night-time attack on the trailhead (by 30 Nov.) but a "counteroffensive campaign" against the NVA continued into 1966 by building base camps and logistical installations. At the end of the month, after his own Vietnam visit, McNamara wrote Johnson a Top Secret Memo that unequivocally proposed strategic withdrawal ("Option I") of U.S. forces. He saw several years of war leading only to a stalemate. Despite departures from historical accuracy, it is a useful film about uncommon valor and loyalty among soldiers, as suggested in the words of the following 1st Cav detachment speech:

"Look around you, in the 7th Cavalry, we got a Captain from the Ukraine, another from Puerto Rico, we got Japanese, Chinese, Black Americans, Puerto Ricans, Filipino, a whole mixture. We are an international army and they fight for us, because they believe we are fighting a just war."

Bombs: The Secret War (2002, 57m, Jack Silberman) >www.youtube.com/watch?v=6HF1g7vHVR0#t=110s

Between 1964 and 1973 the U.S. conducted a secret air war, dropping over 2 million tons of bombs on tiny Laos, thus making it the most heavily bombed country in history. Millions of the cluster bombs did not explode; leaving Laos massively contaminated with "bombies" dangerous now as when they fell. The problem of unexploded cluster bombs is examined through personal experiences for adjudging what weapon to use. They remain a standard part of the U.S. arsenal and were dropped in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. This cohesive, well-documented film captures the history and effects of the illegal U.S. carpet bombing of Laos.

Fog of War (2003, 95m, Writer/Director Errol Morris) >www.youtube.com/watch?v=NO3p1UChGow (22m)

After several books, an 85-year-old McNamara did interviews (23 hrs) for Morris's PBS First Person series (2000). It grew to this multi-award winning film that goes beyond Vietnam into nuclear war. Besides interviews, Morris adds stylisic archival bits, like excerpts of TV reports from the 1960s, illustrated meetings, taped LBJ phone conversations, footage of WW2 air attacks, the developing mess of Vietnam, and rapid shots on headlines, statistics, or critical reports. As General Curtis LeMay's staff officer, McNamara had used statistics to improve WW2 bombing and later got rich as a senior executive at Ford. He escalated Vietnam at DoD, and then headed the World Bank for 13 years. He admits how Vietnam was a mistake and that bombing civilians was criminally disproportionate.

Instead of giving inspiration to this singular revelation, Morris picked the subtitle "Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara" to structure the film. Some are useful but others are trivial, poorly supported, or illogical. Maybe it was allowed as mechanism of deception to give McNamara a way to absolve himself before the American public, as in his 1990s autobiographical books and Vietnam visits. Despite flashes of candor, he backs away from his claims. Some of these issues raised will leave moviegoers stunned and left to wonder why he wasn't hauled away for aiding andabetting criminal behavior. Wasn't that the big question about Vietnam? Why was no one held criminally liable for the vast atrocities in Vietnam - in retrospect - was clearly an international war crime? Mildenly menacing music of Philip Glass at least creates the right mood to expose the dishonesty of a Berkeley/Harvard-educated whiz kid, but not in a cathartic or triumphant way. In order to break the monotony of a "lesson" in making cars "safer envelopes" at Ford (1950s), some engineers are shown dropping human skulls wrapped in cloth down a stairwell. The destruction of bombing is illustrated by percentage numbers as aerial footage plummeting (b/w) toward Japanese cities under bombing runs and contrasted to comparable American cities. For example, on 10 March 1945 the United States incinerated almost 100,000 civilians in Tokyo. Did the Nazis or Stalin ever match that in a single day?

Then McNamara offers a self-indictment: "LeMay said if we had lost the war, we would have been prosecuted as war criminals. And I think he's right...What makes it immoral if you lose and not immoral if you win?" After that, however, he uses standard excuses for Vietnam (middle of Cold War, believed it to be "dominance," following orders, etc.). When Morris asks if he ever felt that he was an instrument of events that were outside of his control. He answers no, that he was obeying orders of an elected President, carrying out the will of the people (!). The unasked question was: "How do you believe that you serve the people if you lie to them?" The codependency with Johnson to top military brass is never really addressed. Both dragged the nation down a wrong road. McNamara admits they misunderstood Vietnam and repeatedly says he thought the U.S. should withdraw. But he continued on the fatal path. Why? Maybe to be rewarded by a World Bank position? Morris concludes the film by asking if McNamara feels guilty for Vietnam. He replies how it would require too many qualifications, but isn't that the only road to get closer to the truth? The diversions leave us unanswered. Maybe that's not a bad thing.

Note that this legal-sized format is designed to "fit" on a letter-sized page.
This documentary focuses on the efforts by the U.S. military during the Vietnam War to oppose the war effort by peaceful demonstration and subversion. This movement took place in barracks, aircraft carriers, army stockades, navy brigs and dinny towns that surround military bases. It penetrates elite military colleges and spreads throughout Vietnam. It was a movement no one expected, least of all those in it. Hundreds went to prison and thousands into exile. In the words of one colonel, by 1971 it had infested the entire armed services. Yet today few people know about this GM movement against the war in Vietnam. Although it speaks today to veterans, but serves as a ready reminder to civilians that soldiers may oppose war as stridently as any civilian, but certainly at greater personal peril.

The film details the crucial role of the Gulf of Tonkin false-flag incident. It illustrates the damage done to Vietnam by a massive air war that added napalm and chemical warfare to conventional bombing. Words from LBJ, Curtis LeMay, Vietnamese victims, a historian, doctor, American pilots, and others bring its brutality home (the Agent Orange section is chilling). Other footage includes Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, Diem, Gerald Ford, Joe McCarthy, Nixon, Senator Morse, and many more. As the film shifts to ground war, American and Vietnamese voices give a window to human tragedy. The point that Vietnam was Ms Lai every week is graphically driven home by recounting the many other massacres that took place. After you witness real deaths happening on the screen, you may begin to understand why some Vietnam vets still suffer with morale issues. At the end, we return to Arlington West and recall the Iraq War. Again the point is made that those who forget history are doomed to repeat it. Martin Sheen and Clairol make a plea to stop the current madness.

**Most Dangerous Man in America:** Daniel Ellsberg and Pentagon Papers (2009, 92m, Ehrlich & Goldsmith) In 1971, Daniel Ellsberg shook the foundations of government corruption by revealing the top-secret: United States -- Vietnam Relations, 1945--1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense. The film dramatically tells how the papers were made public and why Kissinger (Nixon’s NSA) called Ellsberg “the most dangerous man in America” who “had to be stopped at all costs.” But he wasn’t! He fought back against espionage and conspiracy charges (facing 115 years). The ensuing fight speeded Nixon’s downfall. The study, discovered by Ellsberg, was copied by him and his friend Anthony Russo (Oct. 1969) for disclosure to senators and others, even including Kissinger (NSA). None were interested. To encourage debate, US Senator Mike Gravel entered it to a Congressional record, also published by the Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations (Beacon Press). Ellsberg leaked the Papers to end “a wrongful war.” Ellsberg’s story includes his colleagues, critics, government officials, Pentagon Papers authors, family, Vietnam veterans, journalists & their attorneys, anti-war activists; and White House audio tapes. For the first time on film, we have the inside story of this pivotal event when a determined Pentagon insider, armed only with his conscience and improperly classified documents, helped end the Vietnam Conflict. The most damaging revelation was how four administrations had lied. Ellsberg’s relentless truth telling “demonstrated unconstitutional behavior by a succession of presidents, the violation of their oath and the violation of the oath of every one of their subordinates.” The nation never recovered (see: www.see.org).
Emphasis on the North's crimes distanced the American support for South Vietnam's corruption and conducted failed operation. This series exposes the lies told about American policies. The context for the collapse of South Vietnam. There will be sad depictions of the late US General William Westmoreland and a contemptible ex-Watergate deputy, John Dean. There are many clips here ofOperation Phoenix, a failed operation that was particularly expensive. The film will not delve into the causes of that corruption, but will probably help embellish the goals of the current US Administration that needs to win elections against the的照片, and instead created set up a "South" Vietnam in violation of the Geneva agreement. They brought back an incompetent urban Catholic, anti-communist government. Vietnam stress disorder (PVSD). It was based on lies that the media fed to popular accounts. The film includes an interview with North Vietnam's late General Vo Nguyen Giap, who led successful wars against Japan, France, and America. It is based on her visits to Vietnam in 1995 to help bring Vietnamese voices to America because they have been deliberately buried by history. It is based on her visits to Vietnam in 1995 to help bring Vietnamese voices to America because they have been deliberately buried by history. It is based on her visits to Vietnam in 1995 to help bring Vietnamese voices to America because they have been deliberately buried by history. It is based on her visits to Vietnam in 1995 to help bring Vietnamese voices to America because they have been deliberately buried by history. It is based on her visits to Vietnam in 1995 to help bring Vietnamese voices to America because they have been deliberately buried by history.

The context for the collapse of South Vietnam. There will be sad depictions of the late US General William Westmoreland and a contemptible ex-Watergate deputy, John Dean. There are many clips here ofOperation Phoenix, a failed operation that was particularly expensive. The film will not delve into the causes of that corruption, but will probably help embellish the goals of the current US Administration that needs to win elections against the
since WWII, innocent civilians also died in far greater numbers than soldiers. They pay the most tragic price of modern war.

**American Reckoning: Vietnam War and Our National Identity**

Chris Appy’s oral history (2015, 416p), like Studs Terkel’s *Good War*, grounds the lingering damage and legacy of Vietnam in the vivid memories of people who lived it. Essential reading!  

**[The] Best and the Brightest** (1972, 720p by D Halberstam)

This is a well-told story by a journalist with great credentials. He expertly explores foreign policy decisions that led to Vietnam to paint a picture of the catalytic role of naive idealism in shaping modern America. Halberstam had access to some Pentagon Papers, but even with another 30 years of documentation, it is doubtful that he could have done a better book to show how bad and dishonest decisions by smart, well-accomplished people (“best and the brightest”) got us into an unwinnable war. These military and foreign policy experts were incredibly wrong for incredibly long. They advised President Johnson to carry on a fight that past administrations had supported. This absorbing book shows how arrogance by the well-educated, affluent Power Elite led the country into the Vietnam quagmire. They also did not know how to bring it back from the brink. They also knew also about or accepted the wrong lessons of history: Munich taught that nations should not shrink from “tyranny,” but the “tyranny” of North Vietnam was mainly nationalist resistance from earlier colonial wars. Despite their rational mental power, the “best and brightest” didn’t get this. Some who might have warned about it had been purged during the McCarthy period.

Halberstam had personal experience as a correspondent in Vietnam before initiating the research for this book, and he draws a number of intimate and absorbing portraits of the major figures involved in French Indochina. He covers the servile McNamara, the Bundy brothers (McGeorge & William), former Oxford Scholar Dean Rusk, Generals Maxwell Taylor and Westmoreland, George Ball, and President Kennedy. Maybe the book makes a little much of their credentials because these alumni of great schools and families did interact with LBJ (an accidental president) and Nixon to make such bad decisions.

We need not forget the temptations of power and how merely ambitious men are also decision-makers, but Halberstam’s damning version of events has become a standard account. He succeeds in showing forces that acted on flawed individuals during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Whether from honest misjudgments or outright lies, “the best and the brightest” misled the nation. Why? One could argue that there isn’t more important question than the loss of trust in government that traces back to a lack of accountability for, arguably, the biggest American war crime of the twentieth century.

**Blowback** (1988, 407p, Christopher Simpson)  

America’s Recruitment of Nazis and Its Destructive Impact on Our Domestic and Foreign Policy...

“Better dead than Red: the ‘Red Scare’ that inspired the Cold War. It originated with Nazi propaganda Minister Goebbels appeal for last-ditch resistance against Soviets advances in 1945. That same mindset was used by Anglo-American leaders to excite the sedition that started before the final shots of WW2 were fired.

A Cold War pitted the U.S. against its former ally after Stalin entered nine central European countries in the summer of 1944. US intelligence services scrambled to gain an upper hand. They started recruiting Nazis, and that bacillus infected U.S. leadership. The book describes extensive U.S. employment of war criminals (besides rockeists), apparently against communism.

Senior officials at the CIA, National Security Council, and elements of an emerging US national security state recruited the SS, Nazis, and collaborators. Many of their recruits had killed countless innocents as part of Hitler’s “Final Solution.” Such unrepentant mass murderers were secretly accepted into the American fold, their crimes whitewashed, forgotten, or otherwise forgiven by compliant government agencies seeking intelligence.

Others have since examined the topic, but *Blowback* was the first scholarly study of extensive U.S.- Nazi collaboration. The Cold War motivations falsely painted fascist methods as less brutal than communist. Besides propaganda and psychological warfare, they began military operations against anticommunist movements. That led to a US invasion of Indochina, which was considered a “domino” in Chinese or Soviet expansion plans.

**Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam** (1997, 480p, H.R. McMaster)

A popular myth surrounding the Vietnam War is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) knew what it would take to win but was somehow undermined by the senior politicians. McMaster shatters this misconception after painstakingly wading through all the memos and reports concerning Vietnam from every member of the JCS. In fact, they faced a president unified with his advisors divided by inter-service rivalries. This left the JCS unable to offer a coherent conclusion about the conduct of the war. For example the Army and Marine Corps estimated that “victory” would require five years and 500,000 troops. President Kennedy was unwilling to deploy combat units but allowed covert operations with military advisers into South Vietnam.

He claims the turning point came with the assassinations of Ngo Dinh Diem and Kennedy. McNamara became an indispensable member of Johnson’s cabinet and neither he nor LBJ wanted to listen to earlier cautions. When the Pentagon’s war game of McNama’s “graduated pressure” theory ended in stalemate, McMaster theorizes that such warning signs were suppressed to keep LBJ’s anxiety until after the 1964 election was over.

In essence, McMaster’s thesis is that McNamara systematically sidetracked JCS advice. Mcnamara’s *In Retrospect* (1995) bolsters the book’s credibility because he also admitted errors in “judgment and capabilities.” McMaster does not excuse the JCS because they went along with McNamara’s policy, which had salient deceptions that plunged America into Vietnam before it was ready. McMaster’s is diligent in his effort to pinpoint the cause of the Vietnam fiasco. He offers interesting insights on the political and military policy decisions. From his account, the technique left from Macnamara’s administration was a hodgepodge of shallow, apparently thinking they knew military planning better than the JCS. They emphasized analysis and statistics in a forced “communication” process. With McNamara’s active help, John son was responsible for shaping the bad advice he received from political and military advisors. Their conscious actions can clearly be framed as a dereliction of duty.

Johnson’s imposition of war without a formal declaration by Congress was at best cynical, if not criminal but the book clinically exposes Macnamara’s enthusiastic lies about this policy. The actions of JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor, who later became US Ambassador to Vietnam, might also qualify as dereliction.

Under the National Security Act (1947), the JCS was “the principal military advisor to the president, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.” When its mission of giving accurate military strategic advice to the President was partly crippled by inter-service rivalry, Taylor lacked sufficient backbone to either act or resign. He perceived that military action could lead to disaster, but allowed himself to be marginalized from decision-making. As ambassador, he tried to meddle through the danger of the administration’s decisions and encouraged a process of failure. It’s an ugly picture that made it impossible to overcome the arrogance of Johnson and his advisors.

McMaster claims that McNamara was impatient with JCS squabbling and felt its cumbersome administrative system was slow in responding to his demands. Each Service Chief’s desire to further his branch agenda hampered smooth JCS ability. It must not be remarked that McNamara warned Under Secretary LeMay in WW2 and was prone to endorse Air Force strategy because he was familiar with it. The JCS warned why bombing...
The Viet Cong, but a record of ground activity was not a record of underhandedness. For example, the Soviet Union decried "the American way of life," and the Chinese accused the United States of "aggression." The Chinese, like many others, believed that the war was a "self-defense war." One of the tenets of the Chinese Communist Party is that its policies are guided by "the people's will." The Chinese believe in "socialism with Chinese characteristics," which they define as "an economic system in which the state owns the means of production and distributes the profits according to the principles of 'each according to his ability, each according to his needs.'" This means that the Chinese are not interested in protecting their "capitalist" interests, but rather in protecting the "socialist" interests of the Chinese people.

A greater destruction of lives and property resulted from indiscriminate artillery and air support, especially from bombing. There is particular truth in the saying that "the enemy's fires are burning at night, and our fires are burning by day." The Viet Cong had a saying that "a man who burns a village is a coward." They also opened regions as "fire-free zones" with lax rules of engagement. Killing innocent people was an obvious consequence. However, even relocating families and destroying their possessions was an obvious evil. Imagine if it was done here.


The journalistic icon's courageous, controversial book was republished during the Vietnam Conflict to explain our involvement and raise troubling questions about a war that history books claim only lasted from 1950 to 1953. In fact, our longest-lasting conflict began when US troops arrived in 1945. By closely analyzing US intelligence before the official start (25 June 1950), and actions of key players like General MacArthur, Dulles family, and Chiang Kai-shek; Stone takes apart the official story of another "forgotten war." He sheds light on the tangled sequence of outlaw events that led to a containment "pactomania" - like SEATO - that still mires us in Asia. Documents from the former Soviet archives (available in the 1990s) further illuminate an introduction by Bruce Cumings in the newest edition.

**Kiss the Boys Goodbye (1990, 530p by MJ & W Stevenson)**

A prize-winning "60-Minutes" producer and her husband did this story of men left behind for the sake of political expediency, mainly due to a number of classified operations. It continues a POW/MIA's investigation that aired on 60-Minutes. It contains interviews from U.S. intelligence operatives, former POW's, U.S. politicians, families of the missing, and others; sometimes at risk of humiliation or government retaliation. Apparently hundreds of American soldiers were abandoned as POW's of war in the "honorable" U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in the 1970s.

To avoid government embarrassment and uncomfortable questions, the national security establishment and some politicians tirelessly denied their existence and discouraged lovers from finding or freeing them, Stevenson, unhappy with what was shown, quit working for 60 Minutes and wrote this book. It should make most American citizens sad or angry. The authors prove that the Nixon administration maliciously tried some POW's to simplify its exit from Southeast Asia.

**Nation Betrayed by Bo Gritz, (NV: Boulder City Lazarus 1988).**

A decorated Green Beret commander recounts a hazardous mission into postwar Laos trying to recover MIA's and POW's from the Vietnam War, only to discover that high U.S. officials were deeply involved in the drug trade. He documents CIA drug dealing that bypassed our system of constitutional government. The book also touches on 1980s Iran-Contra scandal.


“We Will Finally Apply Nuremberg’s Lessons?” (Sept 2010) by Telford Taylor with New Introduction by Benjamin B. Ferencz

Telford Taylor concluded that Vietnam was a tragedy, “Somehow we just have to understand to teach at Nuremberg” (infra, at 207). What are the lessons and how acceptable are they? Can laws of war be realistically enforced on a raging battlefield? It is worth re-examining how our powerful country is again being seen by many as a giant “prone to shatter what we try to save” (id). He recognized how a permanent institution to punish aggression could be a “turning point in the history of international law.” What was Taylor’s sequel to Nuremberg? The primary lesson was that, regardless of rank or station, individuals were held accountable for their actions. There was no distinction between high-ranking officials and low-ranking soldiers. This made them accomplices to the presidential deception.

---

Fitzgerald is a scholar whose father was an influential CIA Deputy Director. The book title comes from the I Ching: "The King of Wei, K'i, the year of the Dragon: the Fire of the House of Wei is a fruitful black and white assessment of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Because of the widespread occurrence of the element of fire in Vietnamese culture, the "real" American war in Vietnam is often referred to as the "War of the Dragons." The book was published in 1972, 10 years after the end of the Vietnam War. The book has been praised by many for its clear and concise analysis of the war, and has been described as a "must-read" for anyone interested in understanding the events of the Vietnam War.
No nation or person could be above the law. It must apply equally to everyone. Justice Jackson, a leading architect of the trials and Chief U.S. Prosecutor put it this way in his opening statement in the initial trial (1946) against Goering and cohorts before the IMT at Nuremberg:

"Judicial recognition of the long-established and universal conviction that aggressive war is a crime is a milestone in the development of international law and a new foundation stone of civilization."

"that while this law is first applied against German aggressors ... it must condemn aggression by any other nations, including those who sit here in judgment" (id. at 154). The time had come to hold leaders accountable for offenses that threatened the survival of civilization. The IMT Charter, adopted in London by the four occupation powers (Aug. 8, 1945), denounced the plain and manifestly wrong doctrine of war as "a method sanctioned by law." That idea should aggression be an international crime culminated many years of deliberation by distinguished jurists and the eminently fair IMT held that it was "the supreme international crime" since it encompassed all the other crimes.

The court said that law is not static and follows the needs of a changing world by continued adaptation. Condemnation of war crimes and crimes against humanity had ancient roots. Idealists believed that armed force must be restrained. Conventions and Codes at the Hague, Geneva and elsewhere sought to humanize inhumane activity. The war crimes list was comprehensive and encompassed obvious inhumanities such as “wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages,” and “murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war.” In contrast, so-called realists believed that controlling warfare by rules was unattainable and undesirable. That is the framework to evaluate current practices.

By handing down capital sentences for the crimes of aggression, war crimes and crimes against humanity, Allied courts condemned military leaders of Germany and Japan. They hoped that the lessons of Nuremberg would thus lead to a more humane world. The IMT Charter and Judgment were praised by legal experts and affirmed by the United Nations. These principles of humanity were established long before Nuremberg. A right to injure enemies is limited. No soldier must obey illegal orders.

General Taylor’s book opens with a salutation to the American flag, stressing "the liberty and Justice for which it stands." The path his country took after Korea (1950) troubled him. By 1965, intervention in Vietnam was also ignoring lessons of Nuremberg and McNamara resigned (1966), convinced that we could not win. When Taylor wrote this volume, the U.S. was already deeply mired in combat and academics were sharply divided about the legitimacy of U.S. action. Many loyal Americans denounced the invasion and bombings as crimes of aggression because North Vietnam had not attacked the US and the Security Council had not authorized the use of armed force. An ever-escalating civil war between rival political factions. As North Vietnam initiated in the dark days of Vietnam. It included widespread assassination, torture, murder, kidnapping, and rape devised to destabilize the National Liberation Front (NLF) and Viet Cong. Based on in-depth interviews with participants and observers. Valentine blows the lid off of the inhumane covert operation. Most of the victims were noncombatants. They were usually subject to extended imprisonment. Even execution was usually without trial. Sometimes people were simply shot as they answered the door at a suspected house. The victims were typically suspected of working with the VC—though corrupt security personnel likely put many there to extort money or remove rivals. Although there were earlier efforts, Phoenix operated between 1965 and 1972. When the abuses began getting negative publicity, it was shut down and replaced with “Feo.” A similar program.

This was done under the watchful eyes of US government agencies and never punished. More than 81,000 people were “neutralized” and CIA Director Colby, acknowledged that over 20,000 people had been killed and U.S. perpetrators were rewarded. Imagine if an outside power had done this in the U.S.

The new ebook introduction, “The Phoenix Program: America’s Use of Terror in Vietnam” (1940, 469p), (Douglas Valentine) now also available as an E-Book.

This is an exposé of a covert CIA “counter-terrorist” program initiated in the dark days of Vietnam. It included widespread assassination, torture, murder, kidnapping, and rape devised to destabilize the National Liberation Front (NLF) and Viet Cong. Based on in-depth interviews with participants and observers. Valencia blows the lid off of the inhumane covert operation. Most of the victims were noncombatants. They were usually subject to extended imprisonment. Even execution was usually without trial. Sometimes people were simply shot as they answered the door at a suspected house. The victims were typically suspected of working with the VC—though corrupt security personnel likely put many there to extort money or remove rivals. Although there were earlier efforts, Phoenix operated between 1965 and 1972. When the abuses began getting negative publicity, it was shut down and replaced with “Feo,” a similar program.

This was done under the watchful eyes of US government agencies and never punished. More than 81,000 people were “neutralized” and CIA Director Colby, acknowledged that over 20,000 people had been killed and U.S. perpetrators were rewarded. Imagine if an outside power had done this in the U.S.

The new ebook introduction, “The Phoenix Has Landed,” addresses “Phoenix-style network” that constitutes America’s current internal security apparatus. It was used in Central America and Middle East. The failure of torture was shown in Vietnam only to be repeated in Iraq. Neocon lawyers found acceptable ways to adapt terrorism and torture to the American context.

On American soil this is adapted under the guise of protecting us from terrorism using local police that sometimes target U.S. citizens. The wars in Vietnam are the genesis of paramilitarized American police forces as adjuncts to political security forces engaged in suppression of dissent.

There’s no end in sight to the lies of corporate media. The U.S. has backed fascist regimes: Now, despite its communist credentials, Vietnam is seen as a possible ally against China, another communist country whose American enthusiasts enthusiastically trade. The military-industrial state represents “communism” with “terrorism” to keep Americans docile and intimidated. That’s why people need to understand what Phoenix was all about.

**Saigon (1982, 1800p, Anthony Grey)**


It is a journalist’s account of the 1968 offensive was a finalist for 1971 National Book Award. The VC targeted every major town and military base throughout South Vietnam, including the U.S. embassy in Saigon. The attackers took devastating losses but politically turned American public opinion by showing that attrition had failed. There was no “light at the end of the tunnel.” It is based on hundreds of interviews with those in the struggle.

**Thirteenth Valley (1982, 630p, John M. Del Vecchio)**

This gripping novel of infantry combat realistically presents soldiers that are transformed by the harsh reality of facing death. The survival psychology and grunts’ language will help you understand the experience of jungle warfare during two weeks with a company of the 101st Airborne Division.

**A Vietcong Memoir (1986, 370p, Truong Nhu Tang)**

A historical account of the “other side” dispels many of the myths that westerners had about the war. It is well written by an intelligent and well-connected veteran of the early 1950s war against the French. He was committed to Uncle Ho’s galvanizing personality from the time they met in Paris and much of their revolutionary ideology came from France and America. Truong was a member of the NLF, the political arm of the VC and not a VC fighter so the military conflict is not emphasized, but the book shows how South Vietnam disintegrated. The author’s honesty and directness reveals the importance of Vietnamese family and personal connections that found little or no outlet with Western society. We are given an inside view of how a highly placed VC could undermine resistance to subvert South Vietnam from within by co-opting non-communist opposition.

He rose to become the VC Minister of Justice, but later fled in despair to be one of the highest officials to have defected to the West. The book teaches political organizing and illustrates how communism was a convenient vehicle that lacked specific ideology and did not seriously question the risk of Soviet and Chinese influence. The book is also full of true encounters with security forces and the suspense that we would expect in spy novels.


The former French puppets who ran Vietnam in the South knew that Ho Chi Minh would win any free and fair election so they repeatedly broke the promise in the 1954 Geneva accords. After the U.S. installed dictator Ngo Dinh Diem, significant guerilla activity started by reactivated Viet Minh units. The Viet Cong (National Liberation Front) formed in 1960 to resist U.S. backed terror, torture, and “manhunts.” Before alleged infiltrates built casualties. Westmoreland sued side view of how a letter than under capitalism until th security of a poorly armed enemy could beat land—lands. At the same time violation of the Geneva accords. Zinn notes that in 1964 the decision from the North, the U.S. sent thousands of “advisors” in back of security. The Viet Cong (National Liberation Front) formed in 1960 to resist U.S. guerilla activity started by reactivated Viet Minh units. The Viet after the U.S. installed dictator Ngo Dinh Diem, significant guerrilla activity once again.


Military professional Lewis Sorley claims that to understand the failed brutality of Vietnam we need to study Westmoreland and his flawed strategy in a civil war 9,000 miles away. He no more understood those politics than he did domestic politics of the United States. Sorley seems to be searching for an excuse for American defeat, but if a poorly armed enemy could beat America and South Vietnam because of an incompetent general rose or remained too long in high command, how many other generals share such blame? It is sobering to consider the faults of a government that allows political promotions, then and now.

The CBS Special about “The Uncounted Enemy: a Vietnam Deception” by Mike Wallace on 60 Minutes (NY, 1981) was a further expose of Westmoreland’s grossly exaggerated body counts of VC killed. The inflated numbers falsely made the military professional Lewis Sorley claims that to understand the failed brutality of Vietnam we need to study Westmoreland and his flawed strategy in a civil war 9,000 miles away. He no more understood those politics than he did domestic politics of the United States. Sorley seems to be searching for an excuse for American defeat, but if a poorly armed enemy could beat America and South Vietnam because of an incompetent general rose or remained too long in high command, how many other generals share such blame? It is sobering to consider the faults of a government that allows political promotions, then and now.

The CBS Special about “The Uncounted Enemy: a Vietnam Deception” by Mike Wallace on 60 Minutes (NY, 1981) was a further expose of Westmoreland’s grossly exaggerated body counts of VC killed. The inflated numbers falsely made the military professional Lewis Sorley claims that to understand the failed brutality of Vietnam we need to study Westmoreland and his flawed strategy in a civil war 9,000 miles away. He no more understood those politics than he did domestic politics of the United States. Sorley seems to be searching for an excuse for American defeat, but if a poorly armed enemy could beat America and South Vietnam because of an incompetent general rose or remained too long in high command, how many other generals share such blame? It is sobering to consider the faults of a government that allows political promotions, then and now.

Military professional Lewis Sorley claims that to understand the failed brutality of Vietnam we need to study Westmoreland and his flawed strategy in a civil war 9,000 miles away. He no more understood those politics than he did domestic politics of the United States. Sorley seems to be searching for an excuse for American defeat, but if a poorly armed enemy could beat America and South Vietnam because of an incompetent general rose or remained too long in high command, how many other generals share such blame? It is sobering to consider the faults of a government that allows political promotions, then and now.

The CBS Special about “The Uncounted Enemy: a Vietnam Deception” by Mike Wallace on 60 Minutes (NY, 1981) was a further expose of Westmoreland’s grossly exaggerated body counts of VC killed. The inflated numbers falsely made the military professional Lewis Sorley claims that to understand the failed brutality of Vietnam we need to study Westmoreland and his flawed strategy in a civil war 9,000 miles away. He no more understood those politics than he did domestic politics of the United States. Sorley seems to be searching for an excuse for American defeat, but if a poorly armed enemy could beat America and South Vietnam because of an incompetent general rose or remained too long in high command, how many other generals share such blame? It is sobering to consider the faults of a government that allows political promotions, then and now.

Military professional Lewis Sorley claims that to understand the failed brutality of Vietnam we need to study Westmoreland and his flawed strategy in a civil war 9,000 miles away. He no more understood those politics than he did domestic politics of the United States. Sorley seems to be searching for an excuse for American defeat, but if a poorly armed enemy could beat America and South Vietnam because of an incompetent general rose or remained too long in high command, how many other generals share such blame? It is sobering to consider the faults of a government that allows political promotions, then and now.